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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3830
___________

PAIN & SURGERY AMBULATORY CENTER, P.C., as assignee and authorized
representatives of CHRISTINE DENOLA, CELIA GONZALEZ, IRENE PERCIA,
ROBERT POST, DEIRDRE SCARPULLA, and SUSAN WILAMOWSKI,
Appellants
v.
CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
`
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No.: 2-11-cv-05209)
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on September 9, 2013

(Opinion Filed: September 10, 2013 )

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

OPINION

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
In a comprehensive and well–reasoned opinion, Judge Katharine Hayden of the
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (“CGLIC”), rejecting Appellants’
arguments that Appellants’ bills for surgical procedures at Pain & Surgery Ambulatory
Center, P.C., (“PSAC”) should have been allowed as “facility fees” covered under the
policies issued pursuant to CGLIC’s benefit plan. For the reasons set forth below, we
will affirm.
The parties are well aware of the factual setting so we will not discuss the facts
other than those necessary to our ruling.
CGLIC’s denials were based on its conclusion that PSAC does not qualify as a
“Free-Standing Surgical Facility” under the terms and conditions of the CGLIC
administered “Open Access Plan” in question, and the policies issued pursuant thereto.
Appellants concede that PSAC is not a Free-Standing Surgical Facility – which would
require it to maintain at least two operating rooms and one recovery room. However,
they urge that it should be included as an “Other Health Care Facility,” defined as “a
facility Other than a Hospital or hospice facility. Examples of Other Health Care
Facilities include, but are not limited to, licensed skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation
Hospitals and subacute facilities.” (App. 9).
2

PSAC’s facility consists of one room for use as an operating room and a separate
recovery area. Patients are charged “professional fees” and “facility fees.” The latter are
at issue here.
Appellants urge that the District Court misapprehended the applicable standard of
review in its consideration of CGLIC’s denials, and also improperly failed to allocate the
burden of proof to CGLIC. As to the merits, they contend that the District Court erred,
specifically, in concluding that the term “Other Health Care Facilities” is implicitly
limited to inpatient facilities. We conclude that we need not address the issues of the
standard or the burden because, even under a de novo standard, and even putting the
burden on GLIC, the plain and unambiguous language of the policies, as analyzed
by the District Court, convinces us that the District Court’s reasoning was correct and
Appellants’ argument must fail.
The District Court’s opinion provides a salient analysis of the policies before it:
These policies state that “[t]The term Other Health
Care Facility means a facility other than a Hospital or hospice
facility. Examples of Other Health Care Facilities include,
but are not limited to, licensed skilled nursing facilities,
rehabilitation Hospitals and subacute facilities.” (Denola Pol.
57.) Taken literally, the definition would mean that
absolutely any facility would qualify so long as it is neither a
hospital nor a hospice. Such a broad definition would be
patently absurd for two reasons. First, it would render
meaningless the definitions and provisions for coverage by
other, specific types of facilities, such as the aforementioned
Free-Standing Surgical Facilities. Second, it would make the
“examples” provided in the second sentence of the definition
mere surplusage; they would serve as nothing more than
randomly selected types of facilities other than hospitals and
hospices, placed in the list as a friendly reminder as to what
type of non-hospital and non-hospice facilities exist….
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CGLIC notes that the definition of “Other Health Care
Facility” excludes hospitals and hospice facilities, which have
specific definitions elsewhere in the plans. (CGLIC Moving
Br. 17.) The result of double-inclusion of such facilities
would have been inconsistent levels of coverage. (Id. at 18
(citing Denola Pol. at 11).) The fact that the plan did not
expressly exclude other already-covered facilities, such as
Free-Standing Surgical Facilities, from coverage is a
reflection of the fact that, CGLIC argues, “the Other Health
Care Facility clause plainly deals with inpatient facilities.”
(Id.) To support this interpretation further, CGLIC points out
that the fee schedule’s only reference to Other Health Care
Facilities establishes a sixty-day annual cap on coverage, as
opposed to the apportionment of payment to surgical centers
in terms of a percentage of cost rather than the span of time.
(Id. (citing Denola Pol. at 16).) The Court finds that this
explanation comprehensively utilizes each part of the “Other
Health Care Facility” definition to demonstrate why the
exclusion of hospitals and hospice facilities, and the inclusion
of “licensed skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation Hospitals
and subacute facilities,” together lead to the conclusion that
surgical centers do not fall within the scope of the definition.
Of course, the Court need not develop and the parties
need not explain a comprehensive framework for what
particular facilities do and do not fit within the “Other Health
Care Facility” provision. The only question before the Court
is whether PSAC qualifies. The core problem with PSAC’s
argument is that the policies include a very thorough and
carefully drafted definition of a Free-Standing Surgical
Facility. PSAC would fit that definition if it were licensed
and possessed a second operating room, but it is not and does
not. For that reason, it is simply unreasonable for the Court
to get around these restrictions and read the plans as including
a catch-all “Other Health Care Facility” definition that is so
broad that it renders meaningless the detailed limitations of
other portions of the definition. (App. 9-11)
We agree with the District Court’s reasoning and find that Appellants’ argument
that PSAC should be found to fit within the definition of “Other Health Care Facility” is
without merit.
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Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting summary
judgment in favor of CGLIC.
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